"Now We Must Find Ways To Be Released..."
Interview With Political Prisoner Helmut Pohl On The Politics Of
The
Red Army Faction (RAF)
June 15th 1996
There was a split between the RAF and many of the prisoners, and now
the political prisoners no longer present themselves as a united group.
So, for whom are you speaking in this interview?
First of all I'm speaking for myself, but I also know what some of the
other prisoners are thinking. We have all been isolated from one
another
since the 1989 hungerstrike. There was possibility to have an exchange
about
the new situation. Letters are not an appropriate medium for such a
discussion.
Why not?
Our mail has been utilized by the authorities for well over ten years.
The BKA [Federal Crime Office] pours over every sentence, trying to
analyze
the style - that makes discussions impossible. It's just not possible
to
communicate exclusively by means of such a tedious medium like letters.
It's just not an option after years of isolation and the eventual
decline
of contacts to the outside. But the collective does still exist: We are
struggling together for our freedom.
How do you explain the fact that since the 1992 cessation by the
RAF, which ended armed attacks against persons, the prisoners group has
dissolved and the RAF itself has disappeared from the political scene?
The cessation, at least as we envisioned it, never came about. Our
vision of the cessation was meant to stand for a transformation of that
which RAF once was into a political force which could influence new
political situations. And that didn't happen. All that happened in 1992
was that actions were
halted, and everything else just evaporated. The reasons for this lie
in
the fact that a political discussion about how things should continue
on
in the future never even got off the ground.
But there have been a series of texts, full of criticisms and
self-criticisms of the RAF and the prisoners...
But these papers from the RAF, and the "self-criticism", weren't real
critiques. It was just a rehash of the 1980s, putting it through the
wash one more
time. The so-called "new politics" of the RAF was just an attempt to
make
a variant of "revolutionary politics" on top of the old foundation, a
reproduction
of the same, but this time done the right way, so to speak. But there
was
never a complete break from the old concept. In line with this, I think
it's
important for those who are still underground to announce the
dissolution
of the RAF. Other prisoners expressly told me to say that in this
interview.
The RAF must be dissolved, then we can see what develops.
How should the discussion have gone, in your opinion?
In order to explain that, we need to look at the history of the
cessation discussion. In 1987, the prisoners made mention of a
cessation for the first time...
In other words, after the attacks on MTU manager Ernst Zimmermann,
Siemens manager Kurt Beckurts, and the diplomat Gerold von Braunmuehl.
Was there
a connection between these attacks and talk of a cessation?
Thoughts of a cessation had more to do with international developments.
By 1987, it was clear to us that things were going to change. That
meant, in our opinion, that the entire concept of the RAF up to that
point needed to be put in question. But no discussion followed from
this analysis, things just got stuck. That criticism is also applies to
us, the prisoners: At
that time, when it was clear to us that we weren't going to get any
further,
we should have stated clearly that things can't go on in the same way.
But
at that time we thought we couldn't push that through. We just didn't
have
enough fundamental thoughts on this. We, far away in prisons, isolated
from
one another, weren't in a position to say what it all means and how
things
should continue. But we should have said something nonetheless. But
still,
we were some of the few people who had our fingers on the pulse, so to
speak.
In the 1989 hungerstrike, we tried once again to introduce a
fundamental reorientation. We were pushing for the RAF to stops its
actions, then for a political discussion to start, then freedom for the
political prisoners.
That was a demand issued internally?
Yes, those were our internal discussions concerning the armed actions.
How, in your opinion, did international developments lead to armed
struggle no longer being relevant?
The politics of the RAF are always immediately associated with armed
struggle. But it was never supposed to be that way, and the fact that
it became that way was a mistake. So the thoughts of a cessation had
nothing to do with
armed struggle per se. All across the world, a tendency towards
marginalization could be seen. One example from our discussions at that
time. In Central
America, a war of destruction was being waged, but over here it was
hardly
taken notice of, on the contrary, quite a different image was being
portrayed.
Here it was assumed that supposedly democratic steps were taking hold
there,
when in reality entire areas were being destroyed. At the same time,
the
ruling powers were able to push through nearly all over their projects
in
Central Europe. Whether it was gene technology, atomic energy, Fortress
Europe,
or remilitarization, there were qualitative changes taking place. I
should
mention that all of this became clear to us then, but some
non-Europeans
said to us that they had been discussing that back in 1980; that says
something.
That's why it was of great importance to us that people come together
from across the leftist spectrum and discuss things, so as to
understand the
catastrophic direction things were heading in. It wasn't just our way
of
making politics which had become outdated, other leftist groups, even
bourgeois
ones, had failed to find methods of dealing with the new situations.
That means, the decision to halt the attacks which had become
characteristic of the RAF was of a fundamental nature. But how does
that fit with your
statement from 1993, in which you said: "The things I have been saying
for
the past few years I no longer say now. And the possibilities which the
cessation gave rise to are gone. So I'll be damned if I'd ever
'renounce'
the armed struggle." That seems more like the hardliner image which the
authorities
have tried to pin on you.
It was certainly a mistake to formulate my anger in such a way in the
concluding paragraph of that statement. But if you read the entire
text, which was
published in 'die taz', you can easily see the message I was trying to
convey:
I will not be blackmailed by state propaganda. At that time, the state
was
demanding that we renounce violence and the politics of the RAF from
the
very beginning - I am not willing to do that. The cessation was not
meant
in that way either, rather it was necessary so as to continue political
work. When we first starting discussing the cessation, people who
visited
us and the RAF had no idea what it was all about. For example, people
kept
saying that we had to keep open the option of an attack. Personally, I
don't
find that to be convincing: If something is done right in the meantime,
then
it doesn't matter if "the option to attack is no longer there". But
even
if people saw things differently, anyway a new form of attack needed to
be found. And so some thinking was done at this time - for example,
instead
of shooting people, high-level acts of sabotage could be carried out.
But
that never happened either. As for the hardliner stigma: That's got
nothing
to do with what we prisoners say or do. Until 1991/92, all the
prisoners
were seen as "hardliners" - despite our attempts to bring about some
sort
of social discussion. That brings to mind the Vollmer/Kasemann/Waiser
Initiative
of 1988 [an attempt by the Greens to win amnesty for the prisoners]: We
responded
to that, not as a tactical manoeuvre, because it was in line with our
thoughts
of a cessation. But the state prevented this initiative. We were seen
as
"hardliners" despite our efforts in the hungerstrike of 1989, when we
had
talks with state authorities and other persons - and despite the fact
that
everyone knew we wanted something new. At the time, supposed attacks
plans
attributed to us were discovered and spread in the media. And this
continued
against the prisoners who were still inside after the cessation,
despite
our public statement via Irmgard Moeller that we welcomed the halting
of
attacks. Facts play no role when it comes to the state's smear
campaigns.
If you look at things today, you come to the following conclusion:
Despite the transformation of the RAF and the necessary political
decision with
regards to the prisoners, a split developed, attributed to a few of the
prisoners and backed by "hardliner" propaganda, and this has made it
possible
for the state to attempt to achieve with those of us who remain what it
has sought to do for the past 20 years, namely bring an end to the
prisoner
problem.
What would be the state's interest in this?
It's important for the state to continue to develop its picture of a
political enemy, and the state under no circumstances wants to allow a
political process to develop, as we propose. The history of the RAF is
to end with an accounting, with the burden falling on some individuals,
and not with a political process. And that's not just the case with the
RAF, rather it's what the authorities have in mind for society in
general.
But the fact that the state can do this is also partly the fault of
the RAF, a group which was never very open to controversial
discussions,
and which was a group which many people couldn't imagine except in the
context
of killing people.
Of course, it also comes back to the RAF itself. In the 1980s,
controversial discussions weren't exactly a speciality of the RAF. It
was the same way
in other leftist groups. The causes for that, in my opinion, go way
back
to fundamental mistakes by us, but also in other leftist groups as
well,
namely the fact that political structures were hardly developed at all.
Instead, ideology and actionism prevailed. But the RAF concept always
stressed the primacy of politics, the armed actions were supposed to
advance politics, not replace it.
Leftist groups often criticized the fact that the RAF acted
primarily on a military, rather than a political, basis.
Yes, but only when it fit with their political concept. That's why
these discussions always failed. I think the fundamental mistakes made
by everyone, from groups on the radical-left in general to the RAF
itself, was that we weren't based enough in reality and were too
obsessed with ideology. There were meetings, papers, concept
discussions, events, campaigns - but these weren't reality. And the
collapse of the radical-left at the end of the
'80s and the beginning of the '90s was the hour of truth for this
structure
of politics which had come out of the '60s - if something had been won
from
the struggle, which was what it was all about all along, then something
should have been taken out of that. But that didn't happen. Instead,
self-dissolution or running in place. And that brings us to the point
that it's not any different for the RAF, the German radical-left, or
the left in general, namely that we were never able to escape from the
contradiction of living in the most developed social system and not
being able to avoid the contradictions which arise from that fact. On
the one had, you want to escape from that system to something
different, on the other hand it's the best of all places that are
visible. This contradiction in our spectrum led to a theory and praxis
of ideological thinking, characterized in cyclical activity and
actionism. I call that "replacement politics". Politics means real
processes. Not ideology. The white European left, and the German left
in particular, was more clever than anyone. No one read more or talked
more than the left here did. But
that's not politics. That's a sign of a stationary process which
remains
adapted to social norms. An example of what I mean by "stationary":
Women
have often noted that the never-ending so-called "sexism debate", the
men's
discussion of it, has only ever resulted in the problem being endlessly
debated,
seen as politically tackled, and everything stays the way it was. And
the
women are right about this. It's a sort of problem-defeating mechanism.
The
same is true for the anti-racism discussion. During the anti-IMF
actions
in 1992 [in Munich], the events served as a replacement for politics.
And the RAF, in your opinion, is part of this stationary process?
The RAF became a part of it. The actions which we carried out in the
second half of the 1980s were fundamentally wrong according to most of
the prisoners still inside today. For us, armed actions always had a
strategic function. They were to make something clear, to advance
something. The actions of
the late '80s were just a series of shootings. And when you get right
down
to it, to their political core, they were nothing but revenge attacks.
And
the RAF knew we would criticize these actions. They knew, from me
especially, that I was against things continuing to develop as they
had, with more people going into illegality. When a concept no longer
has any perspective, you
can't attract new people, even on the basis of maintaining the ability
to
attack. People going underground envision continuing the struggle which
they
had previously carried out in concrete base projects, only now on a
different level, but in reality they are entering a vacuum. I don't
want to create
a false impression here, or to separate us from that. We were all part
of
this process and developed it. I'm speaking now about the changes in
the
relationships in the unwinding the prisoners issue over the past few
years.
We kept it going because we wanted a continuity, from the initial
outcry
to the silence. We all agreed about the unavoidable effects a total
collapse
would have, so we wanted to maintain some source of strength. That kept
us
from the drawing the decisive conclusion.
But aren't you stating a contradiction: on the one hand a
continuity, on the other hand being opposed to new people joining the
illegal structures?
It wasn't about a continuity of the RAF as it had existed before,
rather a continuity of political content. The armed struggle was not
the political content of the RAF. The political content of the RAF, to
be brief, was liberation.
You criticize the attacks and assassinations by the RAF in the
latter half of the 1980s. What was better about the earlier actions?
What's the
difference, for example, between the failed attempt to kill General
Kroesen
and the shooting of the diplomat von Braunmuehl?
You are speaking there about an action where the different
understandings meet one another. We were critical of actions in the
'80s such as the one against von Braunmuehl because the means and the
political goal were far
removed from one another. And that is true even for those of us who
experienced
'77, the so-called "hardliners". The action against Kroesen or the U.S.
army
installation at Ramstein were part of the conflicts surrounding NATO
militarization.
Both were strategic actions, attacks which, we thought, would help
force
the global collapse of militarization in the metropoles.
Preventing militarization was also a goal of the peace movement,
which by and large denounced the RAF's attacks. Didn't that make you
wonder?
Well, there were a lot of things about the peace movement that made us
wonder. For example, the peace movement also had some very
nationalistic
elements. They were primarily opposed to a war being fought here, and
this
wing of the peace movement did not concern itself with imperialism's
interests
or war aims.
But if you criticize the peace movement for having nationalistic
tendencies, then you must also recognize that in older RAF texts as
well. There, Germany is described as being a U.S. puppet and an
occupied country.
Those are tones from the '70s, based in an incorrect, shortened
analysis: The fact that U.S. capital was dominant in the world, and the
fact that
U.S. corporations dominated German corporations, led to the conclusion
that
Germany was a U.S. colony. That was false. But in our politics, this
thinking
only played a minor role.
But the attacks of that time were mainly directed at U.S. military
installations and U.S. military personnel.
Yes, but always in conjunction with NATO and militarization. Those
weren't actions against America as some occupying power. But I will
admit that in the left, and in our structures, there were some weak
areas, some anti-American tendencies which went so far as to reject
American culture. But we, I was underground at the time, always
criticized this anti-Americanism disguised as anti-imperialism is our
discussions and during our contacts. But we weren't always successful.
But I think there exists a false impression of our situation and our
sympathizers from that time. At the beginning of the '80s, we didn't
want to strengthen the RAF, rather we sent people who came to us back
into the local struggles. We wanted structures and political processes,
but all we heard was the demand that we carry out actions. We couldn't
change that pressure at that time. It's wrong to imagine that things
always go the way one plans in a concept. The same thing failed later
on during the cessation debate.
For a long time, the demand was made to regroup the prisoners in one
or two groups so that a discussion could take place among them. How do
you think things should proceed today?
At the present time, we need to get the demand put back on the
table that we need to be released. Now, as before, that is a political
question, not a legal one. We're not talking about some abstract
principle here. We aren't even that affected by the Justice Department
in general, rather the BAW [Federal Prosecutor's Office] and the state
security courts, and our
cases are all well known. Besides, most of us are in very poor health,
so
the question of us spending 20 years plus a few more, depending on the
individual,
is not an option. We need to find ways now of being released. And to do
this, there need to be a decision which is more than words. It must be
something visible, in our prisoners statute: What does someone do, who
will be released in the foreseeable future? That person can build up
social relations on
the outside. The same must also be allowed to us. We must be able to
start
building the foundations for how we want to live. There must be
communication
and projects to work on. Right now, we have almost no contact to the
outside.
I'd like to stress that this interview today has been one of the few
chances
I've had to speak with someone from the outside for a long period of
time.
The biggest success of my time inside has been a 90 minute
conversation,
without the police watching over me, a few weeks ago...
Is this orientation towards communication with people on the outside
a consensus among the prisoners?
It depends, some think regroupment is more important so that we can
make a public statement together. I always thought it was more
important to get out.
We alone are too few to succeed, we need further reaching exchanges. We
can't just keep repeating the catch phrase "discussion" for years on
end. Of course we seek discussions for our common interests, but
communication with the outside needs to mainly aim at finding ways to
win our freedom.
The worst thing that has happened to us, and from it came the bitter
internal splits, was the fact that long years of isolation left us in a
situation
where we could not deal with this isolation. The things which have
happened
over these long years needed to be discussed and looked at together
with
others. But we weren't allowed to do this. Instead we came from
isolation
into the vacuum of our stations, a group of people in prison, a small
group
who couldn't meet together inside and who were prevented from
contacting
the outside. Once the first of us starting having health problems was
when
the isolation treatment really began to kick in. This isolation, which
we
have experienced with our own bodies, needs to be struggled against at
every
turn. If someone has been inside for a long time, afterwards something
needs
to happen, you can't just take off the lid and then that person has to
see
where they're at. And when I say that, as someone who has experienced
it,
I'm not just trying to describe darkest moments of our history, rather
because
this systematic isolation is now become characteristic of prisons in
general.
That which we were subjected to from day one is now being applied to
other
prisoners who are selected to endure it.
Angehoerigen Info #182 - June 15, 1996
